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1. Introduction 
Concepts of option value, reflecting the value of postponing an irreversible investment decision if new 
information may occur, have been developed independently within environmental economics and the 
theory of investment under uncertainty. In the investment literature, the Dixit-Pindyck (DP) option 
value was developed in the papers by Pindyck (1991) and Dixit (1992) and presented in Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994). In the literature on environmental preservation, the Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry 
(AFHH) option value was developed in the papers by Arrow and Fisher (1974), Henry (1974), and 
Fisher and Hanemann (1986). Hanemann (1989) captured the earlier approaches into a consistent 
framework.  
 
The AFHH option value is developed within a setting where the future cost of current irreversible 
environmental damage is uncertain and there could be a gain by postponing the decision until new 
information about the costs arrive. Dixit and Pindyck use the concept option value as the value of 
having the possibility of postponing an investment-decision when future net earnings is uncertain, in 
other words the difference between expected net present value of an investment opportunity and the 
net present value of an investment. In terms of the finance theory this is the value of having a call 
option. For a literature review see Hanemann (1989), Cogging and Ramezani (1998) and Fisher 
(2000). 
 
Although developed in quite different settings, there are strong similarities between the AFHH and the 
DP option value. The conceptual platform for both approaches is that by undertaking an irreversible 
(investment-) decision a firm or a social planner loose the opportunity to use new information. More 
recently, Fisher (2000) suggested that the AFHH option value is equivalent to the DP option value in 
the context of investment decisions under uncertainty.  
 
Mensink and Requate (2004) argue that Fisher’ claim is incorrect. In this paper we clarify Fisher’s 
argument by drawing on the article by Hanemann (1989), whereby we find the conditions for the two 
option value concepts to coincide or not. The main point is that the AFHH option value is derived 
under the assumption that investment does not take place in the first period, neither in the closed-loop 
strategy where investment takes place after uncertainty is resolved, nor in the open-loop strategy 
where investment takes place before uncertainty is resolved, whereas the analysis of the DP option 
value is based on the assumption that investment in the open-loop strategy does in fact take place in 
the first period. Using the notation of Fisher, *1d  denotes the open-loop investment decision in period 
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1 and 1ˆd  denotes the closed-loop investment decision in period 1. The decision variables 
*
1d  and 1ˆd  
can be either zero (not invest) or one (invest). The default assumption of the AFHH option value is 
that *1 1ˆ 0d d= =  (do not invest in period 1), whereas the default assumption of the DP option value is 
that *1 1d = (invest in period 1 in the open-loop setting). While Fisher fails to notice that the 
equivalence of the AFHH option value and DP option value does not hold for *1 1d = , Mensink and 
Requate fail to notice the equivalence of the AFHH and DP option values for *1 0d = . 
2. The Fisher option value model 
As a background for the comparison of the two option values, we first present Fisher’s option value 
model and the first-period investment decisions in some detail. Hence, this section corresponds exactly 
to Section 2 in Fisher (2000) with the same equation numbers. 
 
Consider the problem, as set out in Fisher and Hanemann (1986), of choosing whether to preserve or 
develop a particular area of land, in the present or next period. The development is irreversible. Future 
benefits of development and preservation are uncertain, but information is obtained with the passage 
of time. We assume that uncertainty about future benefits is resolved at the start of the second period. 
Let the benefit from first-period development, net of environmental costs (the benefits of 
preservation), be ( )1 1B d , where d1, the level of development in period 1, can be zero or one. The 
present value of the benefit from second-period development is ( )2 1 2 ,+B d d θ , where d2 can be zero 
or one and θ is a random variable. Note that, if 1 1,=d  2 0=d . 
 
Let ( )1Vˆ d  be the expected value over both periods as a function of the choice of first-period 
development ( )1 10 or 1= =d d  given that second-period development, d2, is chosen at the start of the 
second period when we learn whether or not 2 0=d  or 2 1=d  yields greater benefits. At the start of 
the first period, when d1 must be chosen, we have only an expectation of the maximum. Then, we 
have, for 1 0=d , 
(2.1) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
2
1 2 2 1 2 2
ˆ (0) (0) max , (0) max 0, , 1,⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + = +⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦dV B E B d B E B Bθ θ θ . 
If 1 1=d , we have 
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(2.2) ( )1 2ˆ (1) (1) 1,= + ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦V B E B θ . 
With development in the first period, we are locked into development in the second 
( )( )1 1 21 1= ⇒ + =d d d . To get the decision rule for the first period, 1ˆd , compare (2.1) and (2.2): 
(2.3) ( ) ( ){ } ( )1 1 2 2 2ˆ ˆ(0) (1) (0) (1) max 0, , 1, 1,⎡ ⎤− = − + − ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦V V B B E B B E Bθ θ θ  
and choose 
(2.4) 1
ˆ ˆ0 if (0) (1) 0ˆ
ˆ ˆ1 if (0) (1) 0.
⎧ − ≥⎪= ⎨ − <⎪⎩
V V
d
V V
 
Now, let us suppose that, instead of waiting for the resolution of uncertainty about future benefits 
before choosing d2, we simply replace the uncertain future benefits by their expected value. This 
would be appropriate if we did not expect to receive information, over the first period, that would 
permit us to resolve the uncertainty. In this case, the expected value over both periods, for 1 0=d , is 
(2.5) ( ) ( ){ }* 1 2 2(0) (0) max 0, , 1,= + ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦V B E B E Bθ θ . 
Second-period development, d2, is in effect chosen in the first period, to maximize expected benefits in 
the second period, because we do not assume that further information about second-period benefits 
will be forthcoming before the start of the second period. For 1 1=d , 
(2.6) ( )* 1 2 ˆ(1) (1) 1, (1)V B E B Vθ= + ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ . 
As before, development in the first period locks in development in the second. Comparing (2.5) and 
(2.6), 
(2.7) ( ) ( ){ } ( )* * 1 1 2 2 2(0) (1) (0) (1) max 0, , 1, 1,− = − + ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ − ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦V V B B E B E B E Bθ θ θ  
and 
(2.8) 
* *
*
1 * *
0 if (0) (1) 0
1 if (0) (1) 0.
⎧ − ≥= ⎨ − <⎩
V V
d
V V
 
How do the decision rules in (2.4) and (2.8) compare? First, notice that 
(2.9) * * *ˆ ˆ ˆ(0) (1) (0) (1) (0) (0)⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − = −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦V V V V V V , 
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since *ˆ(1) (1)=V V . Then 
(2.10) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }* 2 2 2 2ˆ (0) (0) max 0, , 1, max 0, , 1,⎡ ⎤− = − ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦V V E B B E B E Bθ θ θ θ . 
Finally, 
(2.11) *ˆ(0) (0) 0− ≥V V  
from the convexity of the maximum function and Jensen’s Inequality, which states that the expected 
value of a convex function of a random variable is greater than or equal to the convex function of the 
expected value of the random variable. Intuitively, an informed decision cannot be worse than an 
uniformed decision.  
 
It is this difference, *ˆ (0) (0)−V V , that has been interpreted as option value in the environmental 
literature. It may also be considered a (conditional) value of information, however, the value of 
information about future benefits conditional on retaining the option to preserve or develop in the 
future ( )1 0=d . 
 
At this point it is useful to supplement Fisher’s explanation with the discussion in Hanemann (1989) of 
the conditional value of perfect information. First, the option value expression (2.9) can be restated as 
(2.12) ( ) ( )* *ˆ ˆ(0) (0) (1) (1)OV V V V V= − − − . 
The first term, *ˆ(0) (0)V V− , is the conditional value of perfect information, the gain from information 
with respect to the choice of d2 conditional on setting 1 0d = . Similarly, *ˆ (1) (1)V V−  is the value of 
perfect information conditional on setting 1 1d = . But, from (2.6) the latter is zero. The irreversibility 
creates an asymmetry: If one decides to preserve initially ( )1 0d = , the decision can always be 
reversed later when more accurate information about the consequences of development is obtained, 
whereas the decision to develop now ( )1 1d =  cannot be reversed, and any subsequent information has 
no economic value. Thus, a decision to set 1 0d =  preserves flexibility, and the option value is the 
value of this flexibility. 
 
Hanemann here points to the analogy between the AFHH option value and the financial option value 
developed by Black and Scholes (1973). Setting 1 0d =  gives an option to preserve or to develop in the 
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future which is worth ˆ(0)V  in present value. Thus, in terms of the financial literature, ˆ (0)V  is the 
value of the option and ˆ(1)V  is its price (opportunity cost). 
 
Moreover, Hanemann observes that it follows from (2.11) that *1 1dˆ d≤ . Hence, there are three possible 
outcomes: *1 1ˆ 0d d= = , *1 1ˆ 1d d= =  or *1 1ˆ 0, 1d d= = . By using (2.4), (2.6) and (2.8), Hanemann shows 
that the following relationships hold for these three outcomes, 
(2.13)
* * * *
1 1
* * * *
1 1
* * * *
1 1
ˆˆ ˆ(0) (0) if (0) (0) (1) for 0
ˆˆ ˆ(1) (1) 0 if (1) (0) (0) for 1
ˆˆ ˆ(0) (1) if (0) (1) (0) for 0, 1
⎧ − = ≥ ≥ = =⎪⎪= − = ≥ ≥ = =⎨⎪ − = + = ≥ ≥ = =⎪⎩
AFHH
AFHH PP DP
V V OV V V V d d
OV V V V V V d d
V V OV OV OV V V V d d
 
where 
(2.14) * *(0) (1)= −PPOV V V  
is the pure postponement value as defined by Mensink and Requate. 
 
The first case corresponds to *1 1ˆ 0= =d d . From (2.4) and (2.8) it follows that 1ˆ 0=d  corresponds to 
ˆ ˆ(0) (1)V V≥  and *1 0=d  corresponds to * *(0) (1)V V≥ , hence *1 1ˆ 0d d= =  corresponds to 
* *ˆ (0) (0) (1)≥ ≥V V V  as stated in (2.13). In this case the option value equals the AFHH option value. 
The second case corresponds to *1 1ˆ 1= =d d . There is no option value when investment takes place in 
the first period. The third case corresponds to *1 1ˆ 0, 1d d= = . The expression for the option value is 
obtained from 
(2.15) * * * *ˆ ˆ(0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1)= − = − + − = + =AFHH PP DPOV V V V V V V OV OV OV . 
The pure postponement value is negative in the case of 1ˆ 0d = , *1 1d = , as this case corresponds to 
* *ˆ (0) (1) (0)V V V≥ ≥ . Hence, * *(0) (1) 0,− <V V  reflecting the loss from postponing investment in the 
open-loop strategy when there is no gain from future information. In this case the option value equals 
the DP option value as discussed by Mensink and Requate (2004). When the open-loop strategy 
implies that first period investment is optimal, *1 1d = , the DP option value is less than the AFHH 
option value. The pure postponement value is also negative in the case of *1 1ˆ 1= =d d . Since the option 
value is zero, there is no gain in postponing the investment.  
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In the first case, *1 1ˆ 0= =d d , the pure postponement value is positive, reflecting the positive option 
value of not investing in the first period. It follows from the optimality condition for *1d  that the pure 
postponement value is positive when *1 0=d  and negative when *1 1=d . Note that the pure 
postponement value is defined in terms of the open-loop strategy, hence it only represents the time 
aspect, not the information aspect of the decision problem.  
3. The Mensink-Requate interpretation of the Dixit-Pindyck 
option value 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) define their option value 0 0−ΩF  in the text on page 97 and 98, as the 
difference between the full opportunity, F0, the net present value of the whole investment opportunity 
optimally deployed, and the termination value, 0Ω , the net payoff of the project to the firm, if it has to 
decide in the first period whether to invest or not. The termination value, 0Ω , is defined as 
(3.1) { }0 0max ,0Ω = −V I  
where V0 is the expected present value of the revenues the firm gets if it invests and I is the investment 
cost. Dixit and Pindyck denote 0Ω  as the termination value, since the decision to invest or not in the 
first period terminates the decision process. The full opportunity, F0, is defined as 
(3.2) { }0 0 11max , max ,01
⎧ ⎫= − ⎡ − ⎤⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦+⎩ ⎭F V I E V Ir . 
Here 0Ω  corresponds to the open-loop strategy, and F0 corresponds to the closed-loop strategy. In the 
notation of the Fisher model, we have that 
(3.3) *0 ˆ(1) (1)− = =V I V V . 
Hence, (3.1) can be rewritten  
(3.4) { }*0 max (1),0Ω = V , 
and (3.2) corresponds to 
(3.5) { }0 ˆ ˆmax (0), (1)=F V V . 
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The DP option value thus becomes 
(3.6) { } { }*0 0 ˆ ˆmax (0), (1) max (1),0= −Ω = −DPOV F V V V . 
Mensink and Requate interpret the Dixit-Pindyck option value as follows, 
(3.7) { } { } { }*0 0 0ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆmax (0), (1) max (0), (1) max (1),= −Ω = − = −DPOV F V V NPV V V V B  
where they have redefined 0Ω  as the net present value 
(3.8) { }* 0max (1),=NPV V B . 
The default value 0B  reflects the present value of the stream of payoffs which emerges if no 
investment is made, neither in period 1 nor in period 2. In the context of the Dixit-Pindyck option 
value, where focus is on establishing a firm, this default value is zero. In a context where a firm 
invests in order to substitute old technology, e.g. “becoming green”, the default value would in general 
be positive. In environmental applications, too, the default value is generally different from zero, 
representing the benefit from preservation. 
 
It is somewhat unclear what is obtained by introducing the default value 0B . Mensink and Requate 
argue that the difference between 0B  and 
*(0)V  is crucial for explaining the relation between the 
AFHH and DP option values. However, both * (0)V  and 0B  represent the default values of open-loop 
strategies, and what matters for the option value is the first-period decision, that is, whether *1 0=d  or 
*
1 1=d . As we will discuss in the following section, the relationship between the option values depends 
on the actual level of 0B  and 
*(0)V  in different situations. Moreover, Mensink and Requate assume 
that 
(3.9) * 0(1) >V B .  
This assumption implies that investment in the open-loop strategy is optimal in the first period, that is, 
*
1 1=d . Mensink and Requate for some reason omit the discussion of the case where *1 0=d . Given 
this assumption and the assumption ˆ ˆ(0) (1)>V V , it follows that, as they show in (14) and (15), 
(3.10) * * * *ˆ ˆ(0) (1) (0) (0) (0) (1)= − = − + − = +DP AFHH PPOV V V V V V V OV OV . 
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In the special case where the actual value of 0B  coincides with 
* (0)V , (3.9) becomes * *(1) (0)>V V  
and the case discussed by Mensink and Requate corresponds to the case * *ˆ (0) (1) (0)≥ ≥V V V  as 
discussed in (2.13). 
 
The assumption of *0 0 0(1)Ω = − = >V I V B  implies that investment takes place in the first period, that 
is, * *(1) (0)V V>  in the terminology of the Fisher model. However, recall that the AFHH option value 
*ˆ(0) (0)−V V  is defined under the assumption that investment does not take place in the first period in 
the open-loop strategy, so that * *(0) (1)>V V . This point is not stated explicitly, neither by Mensink 
and Requate, nor by Fisher in his comparison of his own and Dixit-Pindyck’s model. The DP option 
value as interpreted by Mensink and Requate corresponds to the case 1ˆ 0=d  and *1 1=d . In order to 
make an appropriate comparison of the DP and AFHH option values, the case *1 1ˆ 0= =d d , where 
investment is postponed, both in the closed-loop and open-loop strategy, need to be considered as 
well.  
4. The analogy between the AFHH and DP option value models 
We will now explain the difference between the AFHH and DP option values in terms of the open-
loop investment strategy in period 1, that is, whether *1 0=d  or *1 1=d . In our comparison of the 
AFHH and DP option values we introduce a more general default value D that may represent any type 
of open-loop strategy with no investment in period 1. For comparison of the option values, the point is 
whether *(1)V  exceeds D or not. We will compare the special cases of Dixit-Pindyck, 0=D , Mensink 
and Requate, 0=D B , and Fisher, *(0)=D V . Hence, we suggest that (3.1) is replaced by 
(4.1) { }0 0max ,Ω = −V I D  
where the default value D could be zero, reflecting that no investment takes place, or it could be a 
positive number reflecting the revenue from an old technology, or reflecting the environmental benefit 
if no investment takes place. 
 
The comparison of the AFHH and the DP option values must distinguish between the three cases 
*
1 1
ˆ 0= =d d , *1 1ˆ 1= =d d  and *1 1ˆ 0, 1= =d d . It follows from the discussion of (2.13) that the option 
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value is zero in the case of *1 1ˆ 1d d= = . In the following we consider the two other cases. For the open-
loop strategy 0Ω  we have to distinguish between the two cases *1 1d =  and *1 0d = . We obtain 
(4.2) 
* *
0 1
0 *
1
(1) if 1
if 0.
⎧ − = =Ω = ⎨ =⎩
V I V d
D d
 
For the closed-loop strategy { }0 ˆ ˆmax (0), (1)=F V V  we obtain for ˆ ˆ(0) (1)>V V , 
(4.3) 0 1ˆˆ (0) if 0= =F V d . 
Hence, we obtain 
(4.4) 
* *
1 1
*
1 1
ˆˆ(0) (1) if 0, 1
ˆˆ(0) if 0, 0.
DP V V d dOV
V D d d
⎧ − = =⎪= ⎨ − = =⎪⎩
 
By rewriting (4.4) we find the following expression for DP option value 
(4.5) 
* * * *
1 1
* * * *
1 1
ˆˆ(0) (0) (0) (1) if 0, 1
ˆˆ(0) (0) (0) (0) if 0, 0.
AFHH PP
DP
AFHH
V V V V OV OV d d
OV
V V V D OV V D d d
⎧ − + − = + = =⎪= ⎨ − + − = + − = =⎪⎩
 
From (4.5) it follows that the DP option value is different in the two situations *1 1=d  and *1 0=d . For 
*
1 1=d , the DP option value equals the AFHH option value plus the pure postponement value, as 
shown by Hanemann and discussed by Mensink and Requate. The pure postponement value is 
negative in this case, hence, the DP option value is smaller than the AFHH option value. The 
interpretation of this difference is that part of the DP option value is lost when investment in period 1 
is optimal in the open-loop strategy. The AFHH option value, however, is derived under the 
assumption that investment does not take place in period 1 in the open-loop strategy. 
 
For *1 0=d , the DP option value equals the AFHH option value plus the correction term *(0) −V D . If 
the default value D equals * (0)V , it follows that the AFHH and DP option value concepts coincide 
when *1 1ˆ 0= =d d . Otherwise the difference between D and *(0)V  creates a difference between the 
two option value concepts. As we will discuss below, our interpretation of Fisher is that he implicitly 
assumes that *1 1ˆ 0= =d d . In this model it thus obviously follows that the AFHH and DP option values 
coincide. 
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The AFHH and DP option values also coincide if * (0) 0= =D V . Note that this special case 
corresponds to the Dixit-Pidyck model. In (3.1) they assume that 0=D , and the assumption *(0) 0=V  
corresponds to a situation where the default value of not investing in period 1 in the open-loop strategy 
is zero. If *(0) 0=V , it follows from (4.5) that =DP AFHHOV OV  for *1 0=d  and 
*(1)= −DP AFHHOV OV V  for *1 1=d . Hence, the option values coincide when the investment option is 
retained both in the closed-loop and the open-loop strategy, while in the case where investment in 
period 1 is optimal in the open-loop strategy, the DP option value equals the AFHH option value 
minus the present value of the investment project. 
 
If 0=D B , it follows from (4.5) that the AFHH and DP option values coincide if *0 (0)=B V . While 
0B  and 
*(0)V  refer to two different situations, namely, that investment takes place neither in period 1 
nor in period 2, as compared to the possibility that investment may take place in period 2, what matters 
for the actual option values is the decision in period 1 that determines the actual level of the default 
values, as exemplifized with the default value D covering both *(0)V  and 0B  as special cases. 
 
In the case where *0 (0)= ≠D B V , it follows from (4.5) that 
(4.6) *0if (0)
DP AFHHOV OV B V< >> < . 
The DP option value exceeds the AFHH option value in the case where the default value of not 
investing in period 1 is smaller in the now-or-never context. 
 
Finally, we will review Fisher’s comparison of the AFHH and DP option values. In Fisher’s 
comparison of the two option value concepts, he interprets 0Ω  in his equation (13´) as 
(4.7) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }{ }0 1 2 1 2 2max (1) 1, , (0) max 0, , 1,Ω = + +B E B B E B E Bθ θ θ . 
Fisher says that the first part of the maximum expression equals *0 (1)− =V I V . However, he is 
somewhat unclear about the second part of the maximum expression. In the text after (13´) he first 
says that it is zero, corresponding to the default value in the Dixit-Pindyck framework. Then he 
proceeds to explain that in an environmental setting, the default value may be different from zero. We 
first interpret Fisher such that the default value is * (0)V . Hence, 
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(4.8) { }* *0 max (1), (0)Ω = V V . 
Fisher interprets F0 in his equation (17´) as 
(4.9) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }( ){ } { }0 1 2 1 2 2 ˆ ˆmax (1) 1, , (0) max 0, , 1, max (1), (0)= + + =F B E B B E B B V Vθ θ θ  
where the latter equality follows from the definition of ˆ(0)V . Fisher’s explanation of his option value 
expression (18) is somewhat ambiguous. Mensink and Requate claim that Fisher makes an algebraic 
mistake in subtracting the two maximum expressions. In our view, Fisher may have tacitly assumed 
that the AFHH option value is only meaningful under the assumption that *1 1ˆ 0= =d d , that is, 
ˆ ˆ(0) (1)>V V  and * *(0) (1)>V V . In this case it follows from (4.7), (4.8) and (4.9) that 
( ) ( ){ }( )0 2 2 ˆmax 0, , 1, (0)F E B B Vθ θ= =  and ( )( ) ( )( ){ } *0 2 2max 0, , 1, (0)E B E B Vθ θΩ = = . With this 
interpretation Fisher correctly obtains in (18) that 
(4.10) *0 0 ˆ (0) (0)= −Ω = − =DP AFHHOV F V V OV . 
Only when the open-loop and closed-loop strategies coincide, and investment does not take place in 
period 1, that is, *1 1ˆ 0= =d d , and the default value for not investing is * (0)V , are the AFHH and DP 
option values equivalent.  
 
Let us then interpret Fisher such that the default value of not investing in the first period in the open-
loop strategy is zero. This case will illustrate the situation * *(1) (0)V V≥  which Fisher disregarded in 
his analysis. Hence, (4.8) is replaced by 
(4.11) { }*0 max (1),0VΩ =  
and (4.10) is replaced by 
(4.12) 
* * *
0 0 * * *
ˆ (0) (1) if (1) (0) 0
ˆ(0) (0) if (1) (0) 0.
AFHH PP
DP
AFHH AFHH
V V OV OV V V
OV F
V OV V OV V V
⎧ − = + > >⎪= −Ω = ⎨ = + = = =⎪⎩
 
As shown before, in the first case, corresponding to 1ˆ 0d =  and *1 1d = , the DP option value equals the 
AFHH option value plus the (negative) pure postponement value. This is the case where Mensink and 
Requate supplement Fisher’s analysis. In the second case, where investment is not profitable in period 
1 in the open-loop strategy, the DP option value equals the AFHH option value plus * (0)V , and in the 
14 
special case * *(0) (1) 0V V= = , that is, the pure postponement value is zero, the AFHH and DP option 
values coincide. For analysis of 0B  as default value, we refer to the discussion above. 
 
To summarize, we have shown that the default value *(0)V  of not investing in period 1 in the open-
loop strategy is a crucial parameter in the comparison of the AFHH and DP option values. The level of 
* (0)V  relative to *(1)V  determines whether *1 0d =  or *1 1d = . The distinction between the open-loop 
strategies *1 0d =  and *1 1d =  is the basis for finding the conditions for the AFHH and DP option values 
to coincide or not. 
5. Concluding remarks 
In their comparisons of the AFHH option value and the DP option value, neither Fisher nor Mensink 
and Requate recognize the crucial distinction between the open-loop strategies *1 0d =  and *1 1d =  for 
deriving the correct option value concepts. Fisher focuses on the environmental preservation context 
where *1 0d =  is the default investment decision in period 1 in the open-loop strategy, whereas 
Mensink and Requate focus on an investment context where *1 1d =  is the default investment decision 
in period 1 in the open-loop strategy. Hence, both articles fail to notice what Hanemann (1989) 
pointed out in the context of information, and what in our context implies a condition for the 
equivalence of the option values. The AFHH and DP option values are not equivalent for 1ˆ 0=d , 
*
1 1d = , unless the pure postponement value is zero, whereas in the case 1ˆ 0=d , *1 0d = , the AFHH and 
DP option values are equivalent. 
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